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Abstract  Morzuch  et al.; Bailey and Womack;  de Gorter and
This  paper  presents  findings  from  an analytical  Paddock;  Lee  and  Helmberger;  McIntosh  and
scheme that offers a promising  alternative to tradi-  Shideed). In the development of  policy variables, the
tional procedures of modeling acreage response. The  basic methodology  adopted  by most studies is the
scheme  addresses the two-step  decision process in  one  developed  by Houck  and Subotnik,  who  col-
which program and nonprogram  planting decisions  lapsed the price support rate with the program acre-
are modeled separately,  conditional on the decision  age  restriction  requirements  into  one  composite
to  participate.  This  provides  a more realistic  and  explanatory  variable  called  "effective  support
intuitive portrayal  of  producers'  decision  making  price."  Even  though  Gallagher  retains  the  basic
process. The model is applied  at the regional level  Houck-Subotnik  formulation,  he  notes  that  this
to assess  the impact of farm programs on acreage  specification  does  not  allow  for  producers'  re-
response for corn in the  Corbelt and Lake States,  sponses  to  market  prices.  By assuming  weak and
and for wheat in the Northern Plains. The impacts of  strong  market  conditions,  Gallagher  developed  a
policy variable changes on participation and planted  composite  expected  producer  incentive  price vari-
acreage are also analyzed.  able that  incorporated  both lagged farm price  and
current support price. The reasoning behind this for-
Key words:  acreage response, government  mulation is that  when market conditions  are weak,
programs, program participation  the expected producer price collapses to the support
Ca~Sltructural~~~~ caei  ruu  alevel.  It is higher than the support price when market
Structural  changes  in agriculture  have  often  re-  conditions  are strong. The weakness of Gallagher's
flected the impact of  farm programs that influence  formulation is that the expected producer incentive
acreage of both controlled  and uncontrolled  com-  price will always remain  above support price, ex-
modities as well as the location of production. As a  cept when target and lagged farm prices are equal.
result, integration  of farm programs  in supply  re-  This  discrepancy  is  very important  to  recognize,
sponse models has received  considerable attention  especially in recent years when  market prices have
in recent years.  The most  important tools that the  consistently remained below support level. In addi-
government has employed  to steer the direction  of  tion,  this method results in nonlinear relationships
agricultural  production  have  been  nonrecourse  among  observable  variables,  creating  estimation
loans,  direct payments,  deficiency  payments,  acre-  problems.
age  allotments, and land retirement programs. The  Other approaches  dealing  with farm programs  in
.success of land retirement  programs  requires that  supplyresponseanalysis  includeoneby Morzuch et
producers  be compensated for foregone production  al.,  who  disaggregated  the  time  series  into  years
in order to elicit participation. A farmer considering  with similar programs and then performed  separate
the participation decision must weigh programbene-  regressions.  Lee  and  Helmberger  also divided the
fits resulting from nonrecourse loans and deficiency  period 1948-1980 into a 'farm program regime' and
payments  against program costs resulting from set-  a  'free market regime'  and performed  separate re-
aside requirements.  Given the operational complex-  gressions. The problem with  this procedure is that
ity  of  commodity  programs,  the  participation  it  is  expensive  in  terms  of  degrees  of freedom.
decision requires careful individual analysis.  Rausser  and Just also point out that given that some
Much literature  exists that has examined the im-  policy instruments are used for a  very short period
pact of farm programs  on  the supply of agricultural  of time,  the information  gained  through  historical
products (Houck  and Subotnik;  Houck and Ryan;  observations of their impact may be limited.
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187Recent developments  in supply response analysis  model's  aptness  for  policy  analysis.  The  policy
suggest that much of the  work in previous studies  changes  evaluated are  a 10 percent decrease in  tar-
has failed to develop a consistent analytical  frame-  get  price;  introduction  of  a  10  percent  paid  land
work that distinguishes the factors affecting produc-  diversion at $1.10 per  bushel; and introduction of a
ers' decisions to participate from the factors affecting  25  percent  voluntary  land diversion  at $2.00  per
their planting decisions.  Participants'  and nonpar-  bushel.  The  effects  of  changes  in farmers'  price
ticipants' planting decisions have been modeled in a  expectations were also  investigated. The two diver-
single equation.  In the presence of farm programs,  sion options  were chosen  because such provisions
this  approach  is  less  preferred  because  it fails  to  did not exist in  1989. The evaluation of a reduction
recognize the two-step decision making process by  in target price and of an increase in expected market
producers and imposes questionable restrictions on  price  was motivated  by  the fact  that  the program
the  effects of policy variable changes on aggregate  provisions  of the 1990 Farm Bill provide a greater
plantings (de Gorter and Paddock). For instance, the  latitude for free market production than did the pro-
effective  support  price  approach  by  Houck  and  visions of the 1985 Farm Bill.
Subotnik assumes that an  increase in support price
will almost always increase aggregate planted  acre-  CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
age.  de  Gorter  and  Paddock  contended  that this 
analysis  ignores the  potential  offsetting effects  of  roder  a  eect  corn wrctin or outs
program participants'  and nonparticipants'  planted  produer may ee  to  pat cor  the  por  oidle
acreage. Higher support prices could actually reduce  t  program  Underthe program the  tproducer  idles
aggregate plantings as increased program participa-  a  a  a  rn acreage  limitation (base
tion  results  in  more  acreage  being  idled  in  land  acreage)  in  e  for  a  deficiency  payment  and
diversion  programs.  A  more  effective  method  of  diversion  payment when available.  The deficiency
modeling supply analysis in the presence of govern-  payment rate per bushel equals target price  known
ment programs  is to  estimate  producers'  program  in  advance,  minus expected average  market  price.
participation  responses  first and then relate this to  Deficiency  payments  are made  on program yields
program planted  acreage.  Nonprogram acreage  re-  ratherthanactualmarketyields.Theprogramyields
sponse  is estimated  separately,  and this should be  are  established  by  Agricultural  Stabilization  and
sponse  is  estimated  separately,  an  . ,  Conservation  Service  (ASCS)  county  committees.
inversely related to program participants' responses.  The  ervion Service  (A  ) county  committees.
de Gorter and Paddock  conceived  a scheme that  The diversion payment  equals  a payment  rate per bushel,  also  known  in advance,  times  established accounts for both program  participation  and plant-  accounts  for both  program  participation  and plant-  program yield, times a specified proportion of base
ing decisions. The key element in this approach is to  rgra  i  tie  a  p  d  rrion  a
distinguish  the discrete choice  of whether  or not to  acreage diverted under paid land diversion. An addi- distinguish the discrete choice of whether or not to °,~  '.  l,  ,^~  ^  i.  tional  voluntary  diversion  option  exists  in  some comply with government  programs and to show that  r  ,h's  .'  .'terre  d  . i  h  .h  . ^  '.  rontnuou  choic  years  for which  a farmer is compensated  to elicit this is  interrelated  with  the  continuous  choice  of  ..  . this  is  interrelated  with  the continuous  choice  of  participation. A minimum set-aside and/or acreage
how  many acres  to plant.  Subotnik argued that the  a  e 
. . c  ''  Areduction program (ARP) also exists in some years estimation of the discrete  and continuous decision  for which  g  s 
for which no remuneration is paid. The set-aside or model proposed by de Gorter and Paddock requires model proposed by de Gorter and Paddock requires  ARP, when in effect, equals a percentage of the base single farm  observations  and  cannot  be estimated
acreage,  the latter reflecting historical acreage allo- successfully  given the  aggregate  annual data pub-  cation.
lished by  the U.S.  Department  of Agriculture.  He
instead suggested a methodology  in which the deci-  The  starting  point is  a single profit  maximizing
sion to participate  in the program,  as measured by  farmer faced with the joint decisions of whether or
the amount  of acreage enrolled  in the program,  is  not  to participate  in  the  program and  the level of
estimated independently from the planting decisions  production.  A farmer considering the  participation
within and outside the program.  Thus, program and  decision evaluates  the expected profit functions in-
nonprogram  planting decisions are estimated sepa-  side and  outside the program, and chooses  to pro-
rately, conditional on the decision to participate.  duce under conditions with the highest  profit value.
The objective of this paper is to provide empirical  The participating  farmer  is assumed  to  maximize
estimates from the analytical procedure proposed by  expected  profit  np  in equation  (1)  subject  to  con-
Subotnik. This procedure was applied at the regional  straints in  equations  (2)  and  (3).  In equation  (2),
level to assess the impact of farm programs on acre-  acres planted  in the  program  (Ap) plus those idled
age response for corn in the Combelt and Lake States  under voluntary diversion  (Av) must not  exceed the
and  wheat  in  the Northern  Plains.  Three  policy  maximum amount  of acreage  (permitted  acreage)
scenarios  were  analyzed  for  1989  to  assess  the  that can be planted (Ab(1-0  -02))  after the minimum
188requirements for program benefits are met. Equation  dL
(3)  asserts  that  acreage  diverted  under  voluntary  (8)  =  3Ab  A 
diversion  may  not  exceed  the  maximum  allowed  where MC(Ap,Pi) is a marginal cost function for corn
under the provision. and X and v are Lagrangean multipliers. The Kuhn-
(1)  PY  +  PvYpv - C (AP)  Tucker conditions suggest that there can only be four
(1)  Tpb  Fp0Y1A  +  pAv  C(APi,  possible solutions for planted and diverted acreage.
(2)  Ab (1 - 01 - 02 > Ap + A,  and  These are obtained under four assumptions regard-
(3)  03Ab > Av,  ing  the  two  constraints:  (i)  both  constraints  are
binding;  (ii) only the voluntary diversion constraint
where Pp is the program production inducing price,  is  binding; (iii) only the acreage constraint (mini-
Pv is the voluntary  diversion payment, Pi is a vector  mum requirements for program benefits) is binding;
of input prices, Ym is expected market yield (exoge-  and  (iv)  neither  constraint  is  binding.  Assuming
nous trend  yield),  Yp  is program  yield, Ab  is base  yield is constant and independent of planted acreage,
acreage,  01,  02  and  03 are  minimum required  set-  the optimal solutions are, respectively, given in equa-
aside  or  ARP,  diversion  and  voluntary  diversion  tions (9) to (12):
rates,  respectively,  and C(Ap,Pi)  is  a variable  cost  (9a)  A  = (1-O-02-03)Ab,
function. The program production inducing  price is  (9b)  A  = 03Ab,
the sum of expected average market price (the higher  (10a)  A  = f(Pp,Pi),
of the loan rate and lagged average market price) and  (10b)  AV = 03Ab,
deficiency  payment  rate  (or  direct  payments  per  (la)  A  =  P-P)
bushel for years prior to 1974)  when available.  Be-  (  lb)  AV = Ab(1-0,-  ) - ((p  Pi)
cause the deficiency payment was based on program  (12a)  A  A 
yield rather  than  market yield,  it was redefined  in  (12b)  A  =0.
terms of market yield by weighting the payment rate  Under  the  first assumption,  equations  (5)  to  (8) Under  the first  assumption,  equations  (5)  to (8)
per bushel by the ratio of program  yield to market  become  the  ordinary  first-order  conditions  which
become  the ordinary  first-order  conditions  which
yield. ~~~~~~~~yield.  ~means  that Av = 03Ab, implying that  the maximum
There  are  no  competing  crops  for  a participant  m  =  a  i  a
because program provisions do not allow planting of  amount of acreage  permissible under voluntary di-
other  crops on  the  same  base.'- However,  within  version is idled. Acreage planted in the program is
limits,  voluntary diversion may  be regarded as an  (1-06-02-03)Ab.
activity competing with the program crop for avail-  The  assumption  that  only  voluntary  diversion is
able  land. As it becomes more lucrative to be paid  constraining implies that X = 0,  3Ab = Av,  (Ab(l-0l-
for idling more acreage, less  is planted to the pro-  02)-  Av) > A  and PpYm < MC(Ap,Pi). All the acreage
gram  crop.  Given  equations  (1)  to  (3),  the  La- 
'  for  allowed  under voluntary  diversion is  idled. How- grangean  for  profit  maximization  is  given  by
geanforpoi  aiation  i4  s  givenloby  ever, as long as marginal revenue is strictly less  than equation (4) as follows:
t  iY A  +(A  a fA  P  the marginal costs, Ap = O.  Under the 1985 Farm Bill,
(4) L (Ap,Av,,,  ) = PpYmAp + PvYAv - C (Ap  i)  the  farmer has the  option of enrolling  in the  0/92
+ k(Ab(l -0l- 2)  - Av - Ap)  reduced planting option to protect his base. The 0/92
+  V(03Ab - AV).  provision benefits  crop producers in years when the
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are necessary and suf-  risk of negative marketreturns fromcrop production
ficient for optimal solutions.  is  perceived  to  be  substantial  (Thompson,  Knight
(5)  =  Y  -L  MC(AP  <  and Boren). As  marginal revenue increases and ex-
Ap  ceeds marginal costs, Ap > 0. Figure 1 illustrates the
(L  point more clearly.  For ease of exposition only,  it is
A(6) PAY  - - 0,  assumed  there  are no costs  associated  with diver-
\L  sion.  The  relevant  segment  of  operation  on  the
(7)  - = Ab(l  --0 2)-  - A  p > 0,  kinked budget line, 03AbBAb(1-0l-0 2), given the vol-
untary  diversion  constraint, is 03AbB.  At any point
along this segment,  03Ab acres are diverted  and the
Under the  1990 Farm Bill, competing crops  are permitted under the triple base option (on normal and optional flex acreage).
Also in the early  1970s some competition between crops was permitted providing the farmer idled an amount of land corresponding
to the plantings  and set-aside rate of each chosen crop.
189planting decision is based on the principle that 'mar-  diversion  constraint. The planting decision is based
ginal cost equals marginal revenue'.  Some slack of  on the principle of marginal cost (MC) equals mar-
acres may  remain.  At point B,  03Ab  and  (1-01-02-  ginal revenue  (MR). At any price, Pi  < Pp  < P2, the
03)Ab  acres  are  diverted  and planted,  respectively.  farmer  continues to idle 03Ab and plants  (1-01-02-
This also  is the optimal point when both constraints  03)Ab.  Pp  and Pv  have no effect on  a  participant's
are binding. At this point, an  increase in either Pv or  acreage decisions because both constraints are now
Pp will have no effect on participants'  acreage allo-  binding.
cation decisions because there are no more acres to  As price exceeds  P2 and approaches P3, only the
draw upon. However, the increase in these incentives  acreage constraint is  binding. The level of produc-
may attract additional farmers into the program.  tion is determined according to MC=MR. The mar-
Assuming  that only the acreage constraint (mini-  ginal revenue in this price segment is the difference
mum required  diversion and  set-aside or  ARP)  is  between program price and voluntary diversion pay-
binding, then v  = 0, Av = (Ab(1-01-02)-  Ap)<03Ab and  ment.  In the price  range P3 <  Pp  <  P4, price,  once
(Pp - Pv)  =  MC(Ap,Pi)>0.  The  optimal solution is  again,  is  rendered  impotent  as  acreage  becomes a
determined  by equating the difference between  the  constraint. All the permitted acreage ((1-0!-02)Ab)  is
program  production  inducing  price  and  voluntary  planted, and none is placed under voluntary diver-
diversion  payments  per  bushel  to marginal  costs.  n
Voluntary  diversion acreage has no unique solution
and is obtained as a residual because the voluntary  The case of neither constraint binding exists in the
diversion option is not binding. Changes in Pp and Pv  price range P4 Pp <  P5, although the farmer must
will have the same but opposite sign  effects on Ap.  still abide by his available base allocation. As long
As voluntary diversion payments increase, program  as  not all the base is exhausted,  planted  acreage is
planted acreage  declines by the same  amount that  determined  according to the MC=MR principle. As
diverted acreage is increased. In terms  of Figure 1,  price  exceeds P,  the entire base is planted and no
the  optimal  level  of operation  will  lie  along  the  acres are diverted under any diversion option. Once
budget line  Ab(1-01-02)BAb(1-01-02). When there is  again,  price  ceases  to  have  any  impact  on  the
no more diverted acreage to draw upon,  we have a  farmer's acreage  allocation decisions as long as he
corer  solution.  Program  planted  acreage  will  be  remains aprogramparticipant. The curve connecting
equal to the maximum that can be planted (permitted  points PoVWXYZ may  be thought of as a locus of
acreage)  after minimum  requirements for program  points  tracing  the  supply  function  for  program
benefits are met, (1-01-02)Ab,  on the horizontal axis.  planted a
The assumption that neither constraint is binding  Modeling  of nonprogram  acreage  response  is
results in a solution  similar to equation  (10a),  but  straight-forward  given that nonparticipants are not
acreage diverted is obtained as a residual. However,  constraied by program requirements.  The  farmer
as incentives  become more  lucrative,  the farmer's  has a lot of flexibility regarding the use of his avail-
will  to  expand  production  will be  limited  by the  able land  This  implies that a rational producer will
continue  to  expand  production until  the  marginal available base acreage. When the entire base is ex-  contue to  expand production until the  marginal
hausted, an increase in price will have no effect on  cost  of a  partcularcrop  is  equal  to  its marginal
the farmer's  planting decision as long as he remains  revenue.
a program participant. Program planted  acreage will  Defining n*p and n*m as the expected indirect profit
be  equal  to base  acreage,  and no acreage  will be  functions  associated with program participation and
diverted.  lack of it, respectively,  then a farmer will join the
The derivation  of response functions in equations  program  if n*p 2 n*m  and will  remain outside  the
(9) to (12) may also  be understood intuitively  with  program  if n*p < n*m.  The factors affecting the two
the help of Figure  2  which indicates  the level  of  profit functions will  also affect the decision to par-
program planted  acreage at every level of program  ticipate. The effects of the  arguments in the partici-
production inducing  price. At any price Pp  < Po, the  pation  decision  function  will  depend  upon  their
maximum  amount  of acreage  permitted  under the  effects  on participants'  and nonparticipants'  profit
voluntary  diversion option is diverted,  but no  pro-  functions. This analysis assumes the farmer is risk-
duction  takes place because the price  is less than  neutral,  or alternatively,  that  the two  technologies
marginal cost. As alluded to earlier, the farmer may  embody  the same degree of risk.  Consideration  of
enroll  in the  0/92  reduced  planting  provision  to  risk attitudes and other factors like the need to build
protect his base. In the price interval  P0 < Pp  < P1,  a  crop base on farms  with little or no  base  could
the farmer diverts  03Ab in response to the voluntary  change the participation decision.
190EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION  fined. No intercept was allowed for in equations (13)
.. ~.  ~.  .~  . . . and  (14) for years in which neither constraint  was
Empirical specification of the estimating equations  nd  r  ea  n whih neither  onstraint  a binding.  The  reason  was  that during  those  years,
descends  directly from the discussion presented  in  tol  e enroe  the program was assued
the preceding section. Acreage enrolled in the  pro-  to  a  acreage  which was also eual 
gram (Aq) was used as a proxy for the participation  acreage planted
acreage planted in the program. decision, and was estimated as a function of program
production inducing price, own market price, prices  DATA AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS
of competing  crops,  diversion payments,  and base
acreage.  The competing  crops  were soybeans  and  The model was estimated using annual data for 24
wheat for corn in the Combelt and Lake States, and  years,  1966 to  1989. The data were obtained from
corn and sorghum for wheat in the Northern Plains.  fact sheets and publications by the USDA. Program
The planting  decision within the program was de-  variables  and other related variables  on a state-by-
pendent on the program production-inducing  price,  state  basis  were  obtained  from  various  statistical
payments for voluntary diversion, and the planting  summary publications for wheat and feed grains.
constraints discussed in the preceding section. Non-  The market prices used  in the analysis were the
program acreage response (Am)  was estimated as  a  regional market-year  average  prices received.  The
function of own market price and prices of compet-  regional  averages were developed by using share of
ing  crops.  Both participants'  and nonparticipants'  regional production to weight state  average prices.
planting decisions were estimated conditional on the  The diversion payment variable  (Pd) was defined as
decision to participate (Aq). The information for de-  a nonlinear  function of payments on minimum re-
ciding whether or not to participate is embedded  in  quired diversion and voluntary diversion  payments
Aq.  Thus,  conditions  that induce some farmers  to  (Chembezi;  Chembezi  and  Womack;  Subotnik).
participate influence  others not to participate.  Producers were assumed to have naive price expec-
tations.  Under  these  conditions,  expected  market
To  account  for  the different  policy  regimes de-  . Under  these  conditions,  expected  market price for participants  was the higher of the lagged
picted in Figure 2, a method had to be devised with  price  r  participants  as  t  ir  o  t  a
the help  of dummy  variables  (5,  S2,  S3,  and  S4)  farm price and the loan rate. For nonparticipants,  it the help of dummy  variables  (S1,  S2, S3,  and S4) ~  '~  '~  dwas  merely  lagged  farm  price.  Even  though  the
without excessive  loss of degrees of freedom.  The  assumption  of naive  expectations  may  be  a  little assumption  of naive  expectations  may  be  a  little
introduction of dummy variables facilitated the esti-  realistic  previousresearchdidnotreachconsen- unrealistic, previous research did not reach a consen-
mation of acreage  response functions  in equations  sus as to the most plausible  form of price expecta-
(9) to (12) as a single equation. The outcome is much  t  eform  of  erie tions  to  use.  Even the  performance  of alternative
the same as that in a switching regression  model. the  me  as hat  in a swii  eessi  de  forms of price expectations in previous studies pro-
The model was specified as follows:The  model  was  specified  as follows:  vided  conflicting  evidence  (Shideed  and  White;
(13)  Aq = Sl*(ao + aOPp +a 2Pm +a 3Ps +a4Pd) +  Chavas  et al.;  Gardner; Turnovsky).  All price vari-
as(S2*Ab)  + 81,  ables were deflated to  1980 dollars using the  pro-
(14)  Ap = S3*[P,(Pp-Pv) + 5 2Aq + P3RJ  +54[S4*(1-  ducer price index.
Rt)Aq]  + ,5(S2*Ab)  +  2,  and  The equations in the model are recursive in nature.
(15)  Am = yO + ylPm + y2Ps +Y3Aq  +£3,  The application of the ordinary least squares estima-
0  <( 2,  4  <  1,  [as5]  =  RI  -1< Y3 < 0  tor provides estimates that are unbiased and efficient.
'-.  '  '  [ 5,P5J  --  1,  1  . <0  The basic assumption underpinning  the method  of
where S  is zero if neither constraint is binding and  l  least  squares,  however,  is  one  of spherical  error
one otherwise, S2 is the opposite of S1,  S3 is zero if  I  i  the terms.  It involves  the double  assumption  that  the
neither or only the acreage constraint is binding and error variance  is constant  at each observation point
one  otherwise,  S4  is  one  if both  constraints  are and that the error covariances at all possible pairs of
binding  and  zero  otherwise,  ai,  Pi  and  Yi  are  the  observation points are zero (Johnston).  The assump-
parameters  to be  estimated,  Rt  =  (01+02+03)  is the  tion of constant  or homogeneous variance  is likely
sum of minimum required set-aside (or ARP), diver-  to have been violated in this analysis,  especially for
sion and voluntary diversion rates, and ei is the error  years when both constraints (equations (2) and (3))
term.  All the other variables  are  as previously  de-  are said to be binding. In these years, the error term
2Under the assumption that both constraints are binding, the relevant response functions are as follows: Aq = f(Pp,Pm,Ps,Pd) and
Ap  = (1-Rt)Aq.  When either one of the constraints  is binding (but not both), Ap = g(P,Pv,Rt,Aq).  Aq  remains the same as in the first
case. With neither constraint  binding, Aq = Ap = Ab. Thus, program planted acreage equals the entire base when no mandatory  or
additional voluntary  diversion requirements  are in effect  (1974-1977,  1980-1981).  The nonprogram acreage equation remains the
same in all cases.
191Table 1. Acreage  Response Equations for Corn and Wheat,  1966-1989a
Corn  Model - Cornbelt and Lake States
1.1  Aq  =  707.093 (S1 *Pp)  - 751.097  (S1 *Pc)  - 264.991  (SI *Ps)  + 307.536 (S1 *Pd)  +  1.000  (S2*Ab) + 46.812S1
(1.930)  (-2.290)  (-2.770)  (4.000)  (18.670)  (7.000)
Adj. R 2= 0.973  D-W = 1.965  RMSE = 5.305
1.2  Ap  =  149.901  (S3*(Pp - Pv)) + 0.806  (S3*Aq) - 15.751  (S3*Rt)+  0.998  (S4*(1  - Rt)Aq)  +  1.000  (S2*Ab)
(5.930)  (37.850)  (-8.650)  (70.310)  (87.850)
Adj. R 2= 0.987  D-W = 1.843  RMSE = 1.218
1.3  Am = 56.778  +  136.665 Pc - 60.335  Ps - 105.976Pw - 0.948 Aq
(19.980)  (1.880)  (-1.910)  (-1.780)  (-19.640)
Adj. R 2=0.939  D-W = 1.974  RMSE =2.501
Wheat Model - Northern Plains
1.4  Aq = 292.240(S1*Pp) - 273.192(S1*Pw) - 234.801  (S *Pc) + 16.745(S1  Pd) +  1.000  (S2*Ab) + 36.411  S1
(3.020)  (-2.930)  (-2.440)  (2.540)  (30.790)  (10.560)
Adj. R = 0.981  D-W = 1.721  RMSE =2.878
1.5  Ap = 203.329 (S3*(Pp - Pv)) + 0.634  (S 3*Aq)  - 18.113  (S3*Rt) +  1.000  (S2*Ab) +  0.995  S4*(1  - Rt)Aq)
(3.590?  (13.000)  (-2.430)  (33.080)  (24.390)
Adj. R = 0.963  D-W = 1.875  RMSE =2.726
1.6  Am = 22.657  +  142.183Pw - 157.502  Pc - 161.371 Pg - 0.411  Aq + 8.623 S5
(3.840)  (1.830)  (-1.907)  (-1.920)  (-3.210)  (5.790)
Adj. R 2= 0.869  D-W = 1.683  RMSE  =2.693
VARIABLE  DEFINITIONS
Ab =  Base Acreage
Am =Nonprogram  acreage
Ap= Program  planted acreage.
Aq = Total acreage enrolled in the program.
Pc= Corn  expected market price.
Pd = All diversion payments
Pg = Sorghum expected  market price.
Pp=  Program  production-inducing  price.
Ps =  Soybeans expected  market price.
Pv = Voluntary diversion payments.
Pw = Wheat expected  market price.
Rt =  Sum of ARP,  diversion and voluntary diversion rates.
S1  = Dummy  variable, 0 if 1974-77or 1980-81; 1 if otherwise.
S2 = Dummy  variable, 1 if 1974-77 or 1980-81; 0 if otherwise.
S3 = Dummy variable,  0 if neither or only acreage  constraint is binding; 1 if otherwise.
S4 = Dummy  variable, 1 if both constraints are binding; 0 otherwise.
S5 = Dummy  variable, 1 if 1982-85; 0 if otherwise.
aNumbers  in parentheses are asymptotic values of t-stastics. All parameter  estimates are stastically significant at the
10 percent level or better.
is zero  because acreage  planted  in the program is  tory power. The parameter estimates are all signifi-
simply total base minus idled acreage. To account for  cant at the  10 percent  level or better.  The Durbin-
the possibility  of such  a violation,  the generalized  Watson statistics reveal no sign of first order serial
least  squares  (GLS)  estimator  was  applied  in  the  correlation.
estimation  of the  model.  The  GLS estimator  pro-  As expected, farm programs showed strong influ-
vides estimates which are asymptotically more effi-  ence on plantings within and  outside the program.
cient  than  ordinary  least  squares  by  using  the  For nonparticipants, there must be a one-to-one  cor-
information  contained in  the covariance  matrix  to  respondence  between  program  and  nonprogram
improve the estimates.  The parameter estimates are  acreage.  An acre enrolled  in the  program must re-
presented in  Table  1. The values in parentheses are  fleet  a one-acre  decrease  in  nonprogram  acreage.
the asymptotic  t-statistics.  Root-mean square  error  The parameter  estimates  with respect to  program
(RMSE),  Durbin-Watson,  and  adjusted  R-square  acreage were -0.946 for corn and -0.411 for  wheat.
statistics are also provided for each  equation. The  The estimate for corn was in the neighborhood of the
estimates indicate that the model has good explana-  ideal estimate  of  -1.0.  However,  the estimate  for
192wheat showed a substantial amount of slippage pre-  substitution among the outputs.  Secondly, it causes
sent because an acre enrolled in the program reduced  changes  in the decision to participate  along a new
nonprogram plantings  by only  about  0.411  acres.  expansion path associated with output prices, which
One of the reasons the substitution may not be acre-  yield the subsequent changes  in the level of plant-
for-acre is that nonparticipants  may choose to plant  ings.
other crops or to idle land that cannot be used to grow  (  AA  A
the program  crop  profitably  at  the  market price.  (16)  ^p.pAq  Pp  p  '
Besides,  idled  land  is  sometimes  marginal  land  A
which would not  be planted even if there were no
incentives for diversion.  (17)  A . =  +  Am  a  l  Pc
Because program planted acreage  is a substantial  L Pc  Aq  (PCjAm
part of total acreage enrolled in the program (Aq), the
significance of Aq in the program  planted acreage  where tAp.Pp and tAm.Pc are program and nonprogram
equations was  less surprising. The parameter  esti-  planted acreage elasticities with respect to program
mates with  respect to  Aq  in equations  1.2  and  1.5  price  and market  price,  respectively.  All  the esti-
were 0.806 and 0.634, respectively. These estimates  mates are presented in Table 2. Nonprogram acreage
suggest that for every acre enrolled  in the program,  elasticities were generally  larger than those of  pro-
only about  81  percent for corn and  63 percent for  gram planted acreage, reflecting the restrictions pro-
wheat was planted because about  19 percent and 37  gram provisions impose onplanting decisions within
percent, respectively, of the same unit acre was idled  the  program.  This  is  also  explained  in  terms  of
to meet the various land retirement programs.  These  substitution between program and nonprogram acre-
rates  compare  well  with  those  actually  observed  age  given  a  change  in market  or  program  price.
over the historical period.  Equations  1.2 and  1.5  in  Thus,  for every acre enrolled in the  program, less
Table 1 also support the assertion that in those years  than an acre was planted.  The elasticity of nonpro-
in which  both constraints  were binding,  program  gram acreage for corn with respect to price of soy-
planted  acreage may be  approximated  merely  by  beans was positive because the expansion effects due
base acreage less set-aside and/or diversion require-  to  increased  program  participation  dominated  the
ments ((l-Rt)Aq).  The estimates with respect to (1-  direct price effects. This result seems counter-intui-
Rt)Aq,  a  proxy  for  maximum permitted  plantings,  tive at first. However,  it must be realized that as the
were 0.998 for corn and 0.995 for wheat.  In equa-  price  of soybeans  increased,  the relative  profits  of
tions  1.1,  1.2,  1.4, and 1.5 of Table  1, the estimates  being in and out of the program were both reduced.
with respect to base acreage were all  equal to unity,  The relative profits affected the most will affect the
as expected, supporting the contention that for years  numerical outcome. These results suggest that pro-
in which  acreage reduction programs were nonex-  gram profits are affected the most, causing the profits
istent, program  planted  acreage  was equal to total  obtained outside the program to be relatively higher.
acreage  enrolled  in the  program  which  was  also  In his national model for corn, Subotnik observed a
equal to base acreage.  similar  relationship  between  nonprogram  acreage
for corn and soybean price.
Elasticity Estimates  The program production-inducing  price elasticity
The estimates presented here are total elasticities  of program planted  acreage was larger than that of
reflecting the direct price effects and also indirect or  total program acreage for both crops. This is due  to
expansion  effects  from  increased  participation.  the fact that the former reflects  the effects  of two
Equations  (16)  and  (17)  show  how elasticity esti-  factors, each of which had a positive influence. First,
mates for program  and nonprogram  acreage  with  there  were the  direct effects  of the production-in-
respect  to program and expected market prices, re-  ducing price. Second, there were the indirect effects
spectively,  were derived;  and provide an indication  of increased  program  participation.  Both of these
of how the rest of the estimates were calculated.  The  factors  affect program  planted  acreage  positively.
total effect on program  (nonprogram)  acreage of a  The elasticity of total program  acreage, on the other
change  in  program production-inducing  (expected  hand, reflected only the positive effects of the pro-
market)  price  for corn  is split  into two  effects.  A  gram  production-inducing price.
direct or substitution effect represented by the first  The elasticity of total planted acreage with respect
term in the square bracket, and an expansion effect  to program production- inducing price was negative
shown by the second term. In other words, a change  for  corn  and  positive  for  wheat,  suggesting  that
in  the program  (market)  price  for corn  induces  a  policy instruments have been  effective for corn but
change in output price ratios which entails technical  ineffective  for wheat in  reducing plantings.  These
193Table 2.  Estimates  of Acreage  Elasticities for Corn and  Wheata
Program  Corn  Wheat  Bean  Sorghum  Diversion Payments
Model\Acreage  Type  Price  Price  Price  Price  Price  Minimum  Maximum
CORN  MODEL:
Total Program  Acres  0.683  -0.646  - -0.570  - 0.018  0.182
Program Planted Acres  0.741  -0.630  - -0.556  - 0.063  -0.060
Nonprogram  Acres  -1.311  1.414  -0.226  0.076  - -0.114  -0.334
Total Planted  Acres  -0.049  0.156  -0.087  -0.070  - -0.005  -0.092
WHEAT  MODEL:
Total Program  Acres  0.414  -0.220  -0.319  - - 0.056  0.131
Program  Planted Acres  0.461  -0.155  -0.234  - - 0.041  -0.104
Nonprogram  Acres  -1.383  -0.263  1.520  - -0.639  -0.188  -0.202
Total  Planted Acres  0.101  -0.176  0.108  - -0.125  -0.004  -0.123
aAll values are evaluated at the mean. The average shares for acreage planted within and outside the program  over the
estimation period  are, respectively, 0.615  and 0.385 for Corn and 0.085 and 0.195 for Wheat.
results confirm de Gorter and Paddock's contention  ducing price for corn is -0.049, and compares with
that the effects of program variables like target price  Subotnik's estimate of -0.036 and -0.052 to -0.086
on total production  may be ambiguous (i.e., cannot  by Chembezi and Womack. Wheat market estimates
be signed a priori)  because of the offsetting effects  are also consistent with some of the previous  stud-
between  program  and  nonprogram  plantings.  For  ies. For example, values of 0.124, 0.390, and 0.111
instance,  if the  positive  effects  of target price  on  by Bailey  and Womack,  Hoffman, and  Young,  re-
program  planted  acreage  outweigh its negative  ef-  spectively,  compare  with  0.108  in  this  study,  al-
fects on nonprogram planted  acreage, the net result  though Hoffman's  estimate  (0.390)  is much larger.
is a positive  effect on total plantings.  The sign and  The estimate with respect to program production-in-
magnitude of the net effect depend on the size of the  ducing price of 0.101  is difficult to evaluate  but is
elasticities, relative shares of program and nonpro-  consistent with the value of 0.073 by Chembezi and
gram planted acreage, and on the size of the acreage  Womack. It is cautioned,  however, that some of the
reduction program.  estimates from previous studies  are national rather
The elasticity of total planted acreage with respect  than regional averages.
to voluntary  diversion payments for both crops was
negative,  as  expected,  suggesting  that  these  pay-  Policy Variable Simulations
ments  have  been  effective  in reducing  corn  and  The impacts  of three  policy changes  on  planted
wheat plantings over the years. Voluntary  diversion  acreage for corn and wheat  were analyzed to deter-
payments  affect  both  program  and  nonprogram  mine  the performance  and appropriateness  of the
planted acreage  negatively, implying that these pay-  model  for  policy  analysis  (Table  3).  Scenario  A
ments have a depressing effect on plantings.  shows that a 10 percent decrease in 1989 target price
Even though the method employed in calculating  reduced total corn and wheat plantings by about 0.31
these  elasticity  estimates  is  different  from  that  of  and 2.16 percent,  respectively. The increase in non-
most studies, some comparison with previous stud-  program acreage failed to  compensate  for the  de-
ies could still be made  with some caution. The corn  crease in program planted acreage. Program acreage,
market  price  elasticity  of total  planted  acreage  and hence program planted  acreage,  decreased  for
(0.156)  compares favorably  with 0.419 to 0.188 by  both crops as production within the program became
Chembezi  and  Womack,  0.112  and 0.185 by Gal-  less lucrative  and therefore  less able to  induce in-
lagher,  0.130  by  Houck  and  Ryan,  0.137  by  creased  participation.  These  impact changes  com-
Shideed,  et al., and 0.109 to 0.199 by  Shideed and  pare favorably with elasticity estimates with respect
White.  The value  is, however, smaller  than 0.330  to program price (evaluated  at 1989  values) which
and  0.434  by  Subotnik,  0.240  by  de  Gorter  and  showed that a 10 percent  increase in program price
Paddock,  and 0.249  by  Lee  and Helmberger.  The  increases corn and wheat plantings by 0.29 percent
elasticity  with  respect  to program  production-in-  and 2.42 percent, respectively.
194Table 3.  Impacts of Policy Changes on Corn  and Wheat Acreagea
Corn  Model  Wheat Model
Scenario\Acreage  Baseline  Simulation  Impact  Baseline  Simulation  Impact
SCENARIO  A:  (million acres)  (percent)  (million acres)  (percent)
Total Program  Acres  38.316  36.233  -5.437  36.470  35.153  -3.611
Program  Planted Acres  31.987  29.866  -6.631  27.254  25.719  -5.632
Nonprogram Acres  15.926  17.901  12.403  7.560  8.343  10.357
Total Planted Acres  47.913  47.767  -0.305  34.814  34.062  -2.160
SCENARIO B:
Total Program Acres  39.316  41.866  9.317  36.470  37.459  2.712
Program  Planted Acres  31.987  33.289  4.070  27.254  26.619  -2.363
Nonprogram  Acres  15.926  12.542  -21.247  7.560  6.842  -9.497
Total Planted Acres  47.913  45.831  -4.345  34.814  33.452  -3.912
SCENARIO C:
Total Program Acres  38.316  45.311  18.256  36.470  39.061  7.104
Program  Planted Acres  31.987  30.989  -3.214  27.254  26.487  -2.814
Nonprogram  Acres  15.926  13.243  -16.847  7.560  6.580  -12.963
Total  Planted Acres  47.913  44.202  -7.745  34.814  33.067  -5.018
SCENARIO D:
Total Program Acres  38.316  36.790  -3.984  36.470  34.408  -2.013
Program  Planted Acres  31.987  30.974  -3.167  27.254  26.712  -1.989
Nonprogram Acres  15.926  17.632  10.712  7.560  8.189  8.320
Total Planted Acres  47.913  48.606  1.756  34.814  34.901  0.250
aBaseline  refers to the model's  prediction before it is  shocked.
SCENARIO  A: Impacts of a 10 percent decrease in  1989 target price.
SCENARIO  B:  Impacts of introducing a 10 percent paid land diversion at $1.10 per bushel.
SCENARIO  C: Impacts of introducing a 25 percent voluntary diversion at $2.00  per bushel.
SCENARIO  D:  Impact of a 10 percent increase in expected  market  price.
Note that while the impact of a decrease in target  reduction in program plantings, hence the reduction
price in 1989 for corn was a reduction in total plant-  in total plantings for corn. The central issue  in this
ings (Table 3), the elasticity of total  planted acreage  analysis is that when offsetting  effects  of program
with respect  to program production-inducing  price  and nonprogra  lanted acreage are taken into ac-
(evaluated at the mean) in Table 2 suggests  that an (evaluatedatthemean)Tablesuggests  thatan  count, the direction of change in aggregate plantings increase  in program  production-inducing  price re-  . . ncrease n programprodctionncngpcee  associated with a change in a policy variable such as duces total plantings also. At first, these results seem
target  price  is  indeterminate  (de Gorter  and  Pad- contradictory.  However, the results simply  suggest  te  e  rter  and  a
that while the target price option has been effective,  dock  introductn  of a  10 percent  paid  land
on average, in reducing plantings over the years, the  diversio  in 1989 at $1.10  per bushel resulted ina
option was not effective in  1989.  Because  most of  decrease in total plantings for both crops  (Scenario
theproductioninthe 1980s tookplaceinthe program  B.  n s  d an  ra  in bh  par-
in which target price (deficiency payment)  was the  ticipation  and  program  plantings.  This  increase,
supply-inducing  price, it is expected that a decrease  however,  was not enough  to undo  the decrease  in
in deficiency payments should lead to a reduction in  nonprogram  acreage,  causing  total planted  acreage
program  plantings  due  to  a  decrease  in  program  for  corn to decline by about  4.35  percent.  Wheat
participation. Even though this phenomenon, simul-  showed an increase in participation but a decrease in
taneously,  leads to an increase  in nonprogram pro-  both  nonprogram  and program planted  acreage as
duction,  the  results  suggest  that  the  increase  in  more land  was diverted,  leading  to a 3.92  percent
nonprogram plantings was not sufficient to offset the  decline in wheat plantings.
195The last policy scenario  was the introduction of a  grams have  generally  been  successful  in reducing
25 percent additional  voluntary diversion in 1989 at  corn and wheat plantings  over the years.  This con-
$2.00 per bushel. Both corn and wheat models  (Sce-  clusion  is  suported  by  the  fact  that  a  10  percent
nario C) showed  a decline in total planted acreage.  increase in target price (deficiency payment rate) and
Program  participation  went  up  substantially  by  diversion payments  (payments on minimum diver-
about  9.32  percent  for corn  and  7.10  percent  for  sion  and  voluntary  diversion  payments)  reduced
wheat. Because more acreage was placed under vol-  crop plantings  by about  1.50 percent for  corn and
untary  diversion, program  planted  acreage shrank.  0.26 percent for wheat.
Plantings outside the program also decreased as pro-  Second, the question of offsetting  effects of pro-
gram provisions became more lucrative, leading to a  gram and  nonprogram acreage  has been explored.
decrease in total production of about 7.75 percent for  Evaluatedatthemean,theeconometric  results(Ta-
corn and 5.02 percent for wheat.  ble 2)  indicate  that deficiency  payments  (or target
The impact of a change in producers'ice expec-  price), as  reflected  by the program  production-in-
tations was also  examined. The results (Scenario D)  ducing price, have been effective for  corn but inef-
were  consistent  with  intuition  and  prior  expecta-  fective  for wheat  in reducing  aggregate  plantings.
tions. An increase in expected market price rendered  The results  of impact evaluations  in Table  3  (Sce-
program activities  less attractive, causing both pro-  nario A) suggest that target price in  1989 for both
gram participation and program plantings to  decline  crops was ineffective  since a decrease  (increase) in
while nonprogram and total production increased as  target  price  reduced  (increased)  total production.
the decrease in program plantings was overwhelmed  These results are less surprising bearing  in mind that
by the increase in nonprogram planted acreage.  over three-fourths of corn and wheat production in
IMPLICATIONS  AND  recent years has taken place within the program. On
CONCLUDING REMARKS  average, 62 percent of corn plantings in the Combelt
and  Lake  States  and  80  percent  of wheat  in  the
This study has presented findings from a scheme  Northern Plains was in the program over the sample
which offers significant results and valuable insights  period (Table 2).  In 1989 the  share for corn rose to
on  producers'  acreage  response  behavior.  The  about  78  percent  while  that  of  wheat  dropped
scheme  is  an  improvement  over  traditional  ap-  slightly to about 76 percent. Given these figures and
proaches that model program and nonprogram plant-  also the fact that target price is the supply-inducing
ing decisions  in a single  equation.  The traditional  price in the program,  it makes sense to see positive
approaches are less preferred to a procedure in which  effects  of target price  on  program plantings over-
program and nonprogram planted acres are modeled  whelm its negative effects on nonprogram plantings,
conditional  on the decision  to participate.  The ap-  resulting in  i  increase in total plantings. The impli-
proach used in this study provides  a more realistic  cation of this is that target price would seem to have
and  intuitive portrayal of producers' decision mak-  become more a means of supporting farm incomes
ing  processes.  The policy  scenarios  analyzed  cast  than  of controlling  supply.  An  effective  way  of
some  light on the aptness of the scheme for policy  achieving both these goals  concurrently, as has been
analysis.  the case over the years, would be through the imple-
The  results  support  the  following  conclusions.  mentation of target price policy along with paid land
First, policy variables  play a major role in corn and  diversion options.  As alluded to earlier,  our results
wheat  production  decisions,  reflecting  the  strong  demonstrate that a proportionate  increase in all pol-
influence of government programs in the last three  icy prices results in a decrease in plantings for both
decades.  The  program production  inducing  price  corn and wheat.
adequately reflects the economic incentives  for pro-
ducers to join farm programs.  Other policy options  Third,  estimation  of program  and  nonprogram
are also important in both program participation and  planted acreage separately,  conditional on the deci-
acreage  allocation  decisions.  The  parameter  esti-  sion to participate, seems a useful construct in mod-
mates with respect to diversion payments were nega-  eling program  participation and planting decisions
tive for the program planted acreage equations and  in the presence of farm  programs. This also helps to
positive  for total program acreage  equations,  sug-  identify response differentials between program and
gesting that diversion payments may be effective in  nonprogram planted acreage to changes in market or
lowering plantings and  eliciting program participa-  policy  variables.  The estimates  in Table  2 suggest
tion. This conclusion is also supported by the policy  that  nonprogram  acreage  is  more  responsive  to
evaluation  results  of  the two  diversion  options  in  changes  in  price  signals  than  is program  planted
Table 3. Our findings suggest that government pro-  acreage,  reflecting  the  restrictions  and/or  lack  of
196flexibility programs impose on participants' planting  modate  the provisions of the 1990 Farm Bill,  these
decisions.  are likely  to be minor  and will be modeled  in the
Fourth, this study has attempted to deal with farm  same way the previous provisions over the historical
programs in supply response for corn and wheat. The  period have been handled.
analysis  is  equally  applicable  to  other  program  Finally,  the  analytical  procedure  in  this  paper
crops.  So far, the analysis has concentrated  on pre-  should be useful in evaluating  supply response be-
vious programs up to and including the 1985 Farm  havior for time periods  governed by  multiple farm
Bill. However, as we enter the 1990s, the real ques-  programs.  This should be more pertinent if the ob-
tion centers around the effect of the 1990 Farm Bill  jective, in addition to merely  estimating elasticities,
on the overall specification  of this model.  Clearly,  includes a proper evaluation of the impacts of policy
the  1990 Farm Bill  exhibits  some  departure  from  variables on program participation and acreage allo-
previous legislations.  For instance,  the new legisla-  cation, as should be the case.  Some suggestions for
tion  advocates  a  lower  government  support  and  future improvements, however, are in order. First, the
freezes  minimum target price on program crops at  question of risk-aversion has been mentioned but not
1990 levels for five years. Even  though the ARP of  addressed exhaustively. Even though evidence of the
the 1985 Farm Bill still exists, there are no paid land  importance of  risk (price and yield) in production
diversion options (minimum required and voluntary  decisions is  overwhelming  (Just;  Ryan;  Seale  and
diversion  options).  Instead,  normal  and  optional  Shonkwiler; Traill), its significance in the presence
flexible acreage options  are included.  On this acre-  of government  intervention  is  still  in  question.
age, the farmer has freedom to make his own produc-  Thompson et al. found risk attitudes to be important
tion decisions without losing his crop acreage base.  in the  presence of the  50/92  and/or 0/92  reduced
The farmer, however,  loses deficiency  payments on  planting options.  Gallagher and Bailey and Womack
flexible acreage.  Will these elements have any effect  found  price risk to have  little influence  on supply
on the specification? Given lack of data for the post  response  in  the presence of farm  programs.  Seale
1990 era,  it is very difficult to answer this question  and Shonkwiler doubted the usefulness of risk con-
empirically. However, it seems clear that the techni-  sideration  in  supply  response for  regulated  crops.
cal aspects just outlined will not present major ana-  Despite such divided evidence, the question of risk
lytical problems to warrant a major overhaul of the  aversion  in  the program  participation  decision  is
specification. Normal and optional flex acreage pro-  crucial. A risk-averse  farmer may still decide to join
visions  will  be handled  in  exactly  the same  way  the program even if it would be less profitable to  do
minimum and additional voluntary diversion options  so.  Finally, it is suggested  that the analysis be ex-
have been handled in previous  programs.  In short,  tended to the remaining  corn and wheat producing
while some adjustments will be required to accom-  regions.
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